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On 19 June 2009, the Associated Press reported
an arrest by the Dutch police of two suspects in a
robbery case. The alleged victim, a 14 year old
boy, found a photograph on Google Street View
where the suspects were walking directly behind
him. The picture was taken minutes before the
robbery, and the alleged victim found it on Street
View six months later. 
The faces on the photograph used by the application
had been blurred. Therefore, to identify the suspects,
the police had to make an official request to Google to
provide the authorities with the original photograph
where the faces were clearly visible. Google complied. A
spokesman for the police in the city of Groningen,
where the robbery took place, indicated that the
photograph could provide an important contribution to
solving a crime. At the same time, Dutch press has
already expressed public discontent with Google’s
photographing of streets and people, claiming
violations of numerous provisions set out in privacy and
data protection legislation.1 Some members of the
general public in other countries have even stronger
feelings about Google’s practices. In the UK, for
instance, cases have been reported where citizens
successfully formed a human barrier to prevent Street
View’s camera cars from photographing their
neighbourhoods.
The discomfort that can be caused to a person if
caught on camera can be seen on web sites such as
streetviewfun.com, which is a collection of
embarrassing photographs gathered from Street View.
This note considers the issue of the relationship
between the violation of data protection and the
admissibility of photographs obtained as a result of
such (an alleged) violation. The question posed is
whether the clear photograph of suspects that purport
to show they are about to commit a crime can be used
as evidence in a criminal process if the photograph was
retained in violation of data protection requirements.
The question implies two further questions: whether
there are grounds to regard the retention of a
photograph in the clear by Google for six months is
contrary to data protection rules, and if the answer is
yes, the effect that this illegal retention may have on the
use of the photograph as evidence in a fair criminal
process. The question is addressed both from the
perspective of the European Convention of Human
Rights and Dutch national law (implementing the 1995
EC Directive on data protection).2
Alleged privacy violation 
This section demonstrates that data protection rights of
the suspects may have been breached by Google. It is
also possible that the Dutch government will have been
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1 ‘Privacy-issues rond Google Street View’,
Brabants Dagblad, 30 June 2009, 19.
2 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such
data, OJ L281, 23.11.95, p. 31.
188 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
WHETHER A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN FOR GOOGLE’S STREET VIEW CAN BE USED 
AS EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL PROCESS: A CASE NOTE
liable of a violation of the right to privacy as provided by
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).
Google
In order to provide the service of Google Street View,
namely the making available of panorama (360º)
pictures of streets in several countries, Google takes
photographs to cover a 360 view from a vehicle driving
through the streets with a camera on top. Whether this
can be regarded as surveillance is the first question to
determine in order to define the applicable legislation. It
is the view of the authors that Google’s practices do not
amount to surveillance. Therefore, legislation on
surveillance is not applicable to this case. Although the
actions of Google qualify as a recording in public spaces
by a private party, a major element of surveillance is
missing. To qualify as surveillance, there has to be some
systematic, structured monitoring over a certain period
of time. Google only takes the pictures of a street once.
Therefore, the element of a period of time is not
involved.
The body of law applicable to this case is the one on
privacy and data protection. Google’s photographing
falls under the data protection law since, first,
photographs of the identifiable individuals are personal
data,3 and second, taking and retaining the data in a
computer constitutes processing of personal data by
automated means. This in turn means the data is the
subject matter of Directive 95/46/EC and the Dutch
Personal Data Protection Act (Wet Bescherming
Persoonsgegevens, Wbp) that implements the Directive.
When the individuals that are the subject of the
photographs have their faces blurred and are no longer
recognizable (identifiable in the wording of the
Directive), the pictures no longer constitute personal
data. However, as becomes evident from this case,
Google also stored the original clear photographs.
Consequently, there are several conditions of legitimate
data processing that Google should have complied with
under the Directive and the Dutch law but, on the facts
of the case, failed to do so.
First, the processing of personal data is only
legitimate on the basis of the individuals’ unambiguous
consent4 (article 7 of the Directive). However, in most
cases people are not even informed that Google has
taken photographs of them, which is a violation of
article 10 of the Directive relating to information
obligations, let alone the request to opt out if they
object to being photographed. Obviously, asking
permission from every individual included a photograph
before it is taken is, in practice, impossible. However,
the lack of consent only gives an extra indication that
the personal data have to be dealt with in a careful
manner and that the personal data should be removed
or rendered anonymous as soon as possible.
Neither of Google’s practices fall under exceptions
from the consent rule. The legitimate business interest
of Google to take the photographs in order to be able to
provide its service can be a potential ground for
exception under article 7 of the Directive, but it is
doubtful whether there is an interest in storing the
personal data in the form of clear photographs. A
business interest is a valid ground for exception from
the consent rule only when it does not infringe upon any
fundamental right. Personal data can only be collected
for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes. Personal
data should be ‘kept in a form which permits
identification of data subjects for no longer than is
necessary for the purposes for which the data were
collected or for which they are further processed’
(article 6 of the Directive, article 7 Wbp.) In the case at
hand, it is questionable whether this was done.
Although the purpose requirement may have been
fulfilled at the moment of taking the photograph and up
to the moment when the photograph was placed on the
Street View to provide a view of the respective street,
retaining the original photograph with clearly
recognizable faces went beyond this purpose. Indeed,
that the application aims to provide views of the streets,
not photographs of individuals. Equally, that the clear
photographs were stored for a relatively long (at least
six month) period after the blurred photographs were
placed on-line, contributes to the interpretation of
Google’s practices as a violation of the purpose
requirement. If so, the practices of Google would
constitute a violation of privacy and data protection
legislation. If this is correct, then the legality of the
photograph obtained through those practices may be
questioned.
Government
Although it was a private entity – Google – that is
responsible for the alleged data protection breach, the
Dutch government may also be found liable for a
violation of the provisions of article 8 ECHR, the right to
privacy, should either of the individuals recognizable on
3 See for instance the ECHR case Reklos and
Davourlis v Greece of 15 April 2009, (Application
no. 1234/05).
4 See also ECHR Reklos and Davourlis v Greece.
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the photograph in question decide to pursue the claim
of violation of privacy before the European Court of
Human Rights (after exhaustion of national legal
mechanisms) and can receive a remedy from the Dutch
authorities, should it be proven that no effective
measures were taken by the latter to ensure respect for
data protection rights. That is a result of a recent
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in I. v
Finland.5 The case involved a medical worker diagnosed
with HIV whose medical records were viewed by her
colleagues. The Finish government argued that it was
due to the actions of private parties that the applicant’s
privacy was violated, and therefore denied liability. The
court ruled to the contrary:
Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of
protecting the individual against arbitrary interference
by the public authorities, it does not merely compel
the State to abstain from such interference: in
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective
respect for private or family life …. These obligations
may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the
relations of individuals between themselves.
In the circumstances of the Google case, this decision
implies that the government might be liable, if it is
shown that no effective regulatory or enforcement
measures were taken to prevent Google from violating
data protection and to ensure the respect of privacy.
Conversely, the interests of the victim should not be
forgotten. This interest will rightfully be addressed
because the photograph in question is likely to be
admitted into evidence. The violation of rights to privacy
(of the offenders) is a different matter and should be
treated separately.
Admissibility of the photograph as evidence 
A photograph can be used as evidence in a criminal
trial. Articles 339(1) and 340-344 of the Dutch Criminal
Procedure Act (Wetboek van Strafvordering) sum up
what can be used as evidence. The provisions of article
339(1) and 340 permit the judge’s own observation to
be regarded as a form of evidence. This can also include
observation of videos or pictures.
As to the admissibility, it is a well explored area of the
Dutch law, especially when the question is whether
unlawfully obtained evidence can be used. Two case
scenarios are possible: where a state authority commits
a violation in the course of obtaining the evidence, and
when the evidence is a result of the unlawful behaviour
of a private party. As to the first, before 1962, the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the way it
was obtained. Judges referred complaints about
violations committed by the police to the public
prosecutor.6 However, in 1962, the Dutch Supreme Court
(Hoge Raad) ruled against the admissibility of a blood
test taken without the suspect’s consent and therefore
in violation of their bodily integrity.7 Such practices were
found to be incompatible with the meaning of the
Criminal Procedure Act, and safeguards for the
guarantees of suspects as set out in the Act.
The case at hand, however, falls under the second
case scenario, where the private party has committed
an unlawful act that can potentially be used as evidence
in a criminal case. According to the latest case law on
the matter,8 the illegality of a private party’s actions may
have similar consequences in relation to the
admissibility of the evidence, provided the government
has had an influence on the obtaining of the evidence.
For instance, such an influence will take place if the
police requests a private detective to collect the
materials. In cases where the police ‘accidentally’
obtained the evidence or just receive it, the admissibility
seems not to be difficult. In the case at hand, the Dutch
authorities did not actively induce Google’s possible
data protection violations. Although a national data
protection authority had to be informed about Google’s
plans to photograph the streets and people who are on
the respective streets at the time of photographing, it is
more likely that this will not be an obstacle for
admissibility of one of those photographs as evidence.
A different interpretation is possible if the provisions of
article 8 ECHR are taken into account, where the Dutch
government has a positive obligation to establish an
effective system of data protection, including the
prevention of violations by private parties. If a failure to
comply with this duty is taken as State interference, it is
possible to argue that it results in the inadmissibility of
the photograph because of that failure. Whether this
line of argument is effective still has to be seen.
5 Application no. 20511/03, Judgement of 17 October
2008; I. v Finland heavily relies on the previous
ECHR case-law on the positive obligations of the
State: Airey v Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979,
Series A no. 32, p. 17, § 32). These obligations also
involve the adoption of measures to secure respect
for private life ‘even in the sphere of the relations
of individuals between themselves’ (see X and Y v
the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985,
Series A no. 91, p. 11, § 23; Odièvre v France [GC],
no. 42326/98, ECHR 2003-III).
6 G. J. M. Corstens, ‘Het Nederlands
strafprocesrecht’, (Deventer, Kluwer, 2005), 670.
7 HR 26 juni 1962, NJ 1962, 470.
8 See for instance: Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme
Court) 26 May 2009, LJN: BH8800, Hoge Raad
07/11424.
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In addition, when taking the 1962 judgment into
account, a violation of a fundamental right might be of
influence in the decision on the admissibility of the
evidence. Data protection rights are recognized as
covered by article 8 ECHR, the fundamental right to
privacy. This is also one of the legitimate arguments that
may be used to challenge the admissibility of the
photograph in question.
Article 6 ECHR on admissibility
Although the case law of the ECHR acknowledges that
the national legislator is better placed to deal with the
(substantive) law of evidence, it is still possible to find
guidance for the controversy at hand as regards the
procedural fairness of a trial. The case of Khan v UK9
may be invoked as a leading case in this matter. It
follows from this decision that the provisions of article 6
ECHR, the requirement of a fair trial, concerns criminal
proceedings in their entirety and cannot be limited to a
single item of evidence. As a result, the ECHR case law
treats article 8 in respect of privacy violations and
possible consequences vis-à-vis the fairness of the
criminal proceedings separately. The former does not
automatically undermine due process, providing a
defendant is given the opportunity to question the
significance and legality of the evidence and its source,
as well as whether it was falsified before a court.
Conclusions
This note has considered issues relating to data
protection and admissibility of the evidence involved in
the recent Google Street View controversy. The question
considered was whether the photograph of the suspects
supposedly about to commit the crime can be used as
evidence in a criminal trial if it was obtained in violation
of data protection guarantees. The following
conclusions can tentatively be offered:
First, Google may have committed a violation of data
protection guarantees by storing the photograph in
question where the suspects and the alleged victim
were identifiable. Namely, the requirement the
photograph should have been rendered anonymous or
deleted after having fulfilled the legitimate purpose for
which the data were processed was violated.
Second, where no effective measure is taken by the
national government to remedy that data protection
violation (and prevent future similar incidents), the
Dutch government runs the risk of being in breach of its
positive obligation under the provisions of article 8
ECHR in respect to the right to privacy.
Third, assuming that Google retained clear photographs
of the suspects in violation of the data protection
provisions under Dutch law, it may only result in the
inadmissibility of the photograph in a criminal trial if it is
shown that such a violation took place with influence of
the authorities. Whether a violation of the State’s positive
obligation to effectively ensure data protection interests
may qualify as such an influence remains to be seen.
Fourth, on the level of the European Convention of
Human Rights, a breach of privacy and procedural
fairness are not mutually exclusive. That is, the alleged
illegality of the evidence will not automatically give rise
to the breach of the principle of fair trial, providing a
defendant has an opportunity to dispute the legality
and the evidentiary power of the photograph.
In addition to the conclusions, this case may have
further implications for similar cases and raise several
questions, subject to further consideration. For
instance, the internet is replete with web sites where
witnesses post photographs or video recordings of a
crime or other offence that has been committed where
the offenders are clearly identifiable.10 The Google case,
if the photograph in question is admitted into evidence,
can surely have a tremendous effect on the treatment of
other photographs and videos as evidence. What effect
that would be remains to be seen.
© Arnold Roosendaal and Nadezhda Purtova, 2009
9 12 May 2000 (Application No 35394/97).
10 See for instance this post on a neighbour
mistreating his child: http://www.geenstijl.nl/mt/
archieven/2009/01/buurman_slaat_zijn_kind.html.
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